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A Finite-Time Technological Singularity Model With Artificial 
Intelligence Self-Improvement 
Abstract 
Recent advances in the development of artificial intelligence, technological progress 
acceleration, long-term trends of macroeconomic dynamics increase the relevance of technological 
singularity hypothesis. In this paper, we build a model of finite-time technological singularity 
assuming that artificial intelligence will replace humans for artificial intelligence engineers after some 
point in time when it is developed enough. This model implies the following: let A be the level of 
development of artificial intelligence. Then, the moment of technological singularity n is defined as 
lim
𝑡→𝑛
𝐴(𝑡) = ∞. Thus, it happens in finite time. Although infinite level of development of artificial 
intelligence cannot be reached practically, this approximation is useful for several reasons, firstly 
because it allows modeling a phase transition or a change of regime. In the model, intelligence growth 
function appears to be hyperbolic function under relatively broad conditions which we list and 
compare. Subsequently, we also add a stochastic term (Brownian motion) to the model and investigate 
the changes in its behavior. The results can be applied for the modeling of dynamics of various 
processes characterized by multiplicative growth.  
Keywords: technological singularity, macroeconomic growth, artificial intelligence, 
intelligence explosion 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent advances in the development of artificial intelligence, technological progress 
acceleration, long-term trends of macroeconomic dynamics increase the relevance of technological 
singularity hypothesis and make severe economical and societal changes connected with technological 
and scientific advancements more possible. For the overview and discussion regarding technological 
trends in the context of singularity, see Kurzweil (2005), Schmidt and Cohen (2013). 
Various organizations, professionals, and researches related to the AI industry (Kurzweil, 
2010, Sandberg, 2010) claimed that some form of technological singularity may be reached in 21 
century, although they define singularity very differently. Even if the event remains to be extremely 
unlikely, its huge potential impact justifies a more detailed investigation of the problem. 
Mathematical models of technological singularity are widely used to predict and estimate 
important events in the history of humanity, phase transitions, and technological breakthroughs, as 
well as long-term growth rates of economies, populations, and technologies. Most of such models 
imply hyperexponential growth rates of variables studied. 
Finite-time technological singularity concept was proposed in various models: 
lim
𝑡→𝑛
𝐴(𝑡) = ∞           (1) 
where A is the level of development, which can be expressed as GDP, technology, intelligence, 
progress, etc., and t is time.  
Although an infinite level of development of artificial intelligence cannot be reached 
practically, this approximation is useful for several reasons. Firstly, vertical asymptote is a way to 
model a phase transition, a change of regime, a disaster, or a breakthrough. Although the “infinite” 
level of development cannot effectively be reached, the model that describes it can thus predict the 
time of important shifts in the growth trends. Secondly, even if the model with finite-time singularity 
may be not relevant on the whole time interval from zero to infinity, it can describe growth rates 
precisely for a limited interval, as it was with the demographic growth model by Kapitza (1996). 
Thirdly, the models allow describing several growth regimes with extreme acceleration, which is not 
possible without finite-time singularity as a consequence. Fourthly, the definition of technological 
singularity as a finite-time infinite limit of a grows function is more mathematically and analytically 
univocal than alternative definitions.  
Although it is definitely not clear whether technological singularity will or may be reached or 
not, possible payoffs and risks are extremely high. Furthermore, even if the singularity will not be 
reached, development models can be helpful in the study of various local processes in the society and 
the economy with accelerating growth dynamics. 
Of course, explosive growth resulting in the technological singularity (whatever is meant by 
it) must not necessarily be hyperbolic or equivalent. For example, if the singularity is defined as the 
moment when the development of artificial intelligence exceeds the development of human 
intelligence, preceding growth dynamics may be linear or even sublinear. 
The paper is structured as follows. Previous studies overview is introduced in section 2. The 
results of the study (models and empirical estimations) are described in section 3. In subsection 3.1, 
weak and strong forms of technological singularity are defined and discussed. In subsection 3.2, the 
basic model with a linear connection between AI growth rate and engineer intelligence is introduced 
and evaluated. A more general version of the model is given in subsection 3.3. The impact of changes 
in the underlying assumption on the estimated time of singularity is demonstrated here. In subsection 
3.4, the models are extended by adding stochastic terms to them. In subsection 3.5, we explore some 
other ways to reach finite-time singularity even if with weaker assumptions on the AI self-
improvement. In subsection 3.6, the reverse task is solved. Namely, conditions leading growth 
dynamics function to finite-time singularity are defined. Discussion is given in section 4, and 
conclusions are presented in section 5. 
2. Previous Studies 
Since the term “singularity” was popularized by Vernor Vinge (1993) in his essay “The 
Coming Technological Singularity”, various analytical models of singularity based on different 
definitions were introduced. For a comprehensive overview of these models, we refer to Sandberg 
(2010). For the purposes of our analysis, we are interested in the overview of finite-time singularity 
models. 
Basically, the need to use finite-time models can be derived from these words of Johansen and 
Sornette (2001): 
“Singularities are always mathematical idealizations of natural phenomena: they are not 
present in reality but foreshadow an important transition or change of regime. In the present context, 
they must be interpreted as a kind of “critical point” signaling a fundamental and abrupt change of 
regime similar to what occurs in phase transitions.” 
The idea of “intelligence explosion” was mentioned by Good (1965), although finite-time 
singularity analytical models were not developed explicitly. Similar ideas in verbal form were 
expressed by various authors in recent decades (Eden et al., 2012). 
As an example of a simple early finite-time singularity model, we can take the model of 
Solomonoff (1985). It described the growth of an effective computer science community (consisting 
of humans and AI) as a function of the rate of money spent on AI and the amount of computing power 
per dollar, which itself grows exponentially. Moravec (1999) builds another simple finite-time 
singularity model, where the growth trend at the beginning of the process is similar to exponential, 
although he states that the assumptions leading to finite-time singularity are too optimistic.  
A little bit more advanced models, such as city economics (West et al., 2007), deliver finite-
time solutions as a special case.  
Attempts to investigate the concept of technological singularity in the context of the long-term 
macroeconomic growth model also lead under some assumptions to finite-time growth explosion. The 
model of Kremer (1993) has this feature. The model states that the interplay of means of production 
can create finite-time singularity even if each factor, taken separately, cannot. Another model 
connecting population and technology growth is created by Taagepera (1979). Under some parameter 
values, the growth in the model is becoming hyperbolic. Hanson (1998) essentially extends the scope 
of tools of economics which can be applied for the analysis of technological singularity resulting in 
fast intelligence explosion. A similar effect can be achieved via a broad implementation of brain 
emulation technologies (Hanson, 2008).  
Romer (1986, 1990) explores the possibility of the growth rate of economic output tending to 
infinity. Generally, his models of endogenous growth can be used as a starting point of various 
modifications leading to finite-time singularity. 
However, models of explosive technological growth were not popular among economists, 
partially because of the lack of empirical evidence, partially because they required the lack of 
diminishing returns in production functions (Jones, 1995). 
In recent times, the concept of singularity received even more attention from economists. 
Nordhaus (2015) builds various economical empirical tests of the singularity hypothesis, although not 
making distinctions between infinite-time and finite-time singularity. The results of these diagnostic 
tests tend to show that the singularity is not near, yet no specific statements in the form of analytical 
models describing the specifics of the singularity, if it happens, are given. Generally, the singularity 
is considered here as a significant acceleration of growth. Nordhaus also states that “there is 
remarkably little writing on Singularity in the modern macroeconomic literature”. 
More optimistic, although less quantitative predictions and empirical observations are made 
by economists Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014). 
In this study, we propose a model that described solely the dynamics of artificial intelligence, 
without referring to the economic means of productions, demographic parameters, or intersectoral 
relationships. Thus, we show a scenario of how finite-time singularity can be achieved just via the 
internal dynamics of intelligence development. In this case, regardless of the nature of the relationship 
between the intelligence and various macroeconomic and technological variables, the impact of the 
intelligence development approaching infinity on all variables will obviously be huge. In other words, 
the near-infinite level of development of artificial intelligence would imply necessarily dramatic 
changes in the development of technology and economy, with resulting phase transition making 
further forecasts impossible. In other words, rather than predicting specific numerical values of 
various indicators at the moment of singularity, the model attempts to predict the time of singularity 
whereas the singularity itself is characterized rather qualitatively.  
Empirically, both economic growth and artificial intelligence growth appear to be exponential 
at the moment (Easterly, Levine, 2001, Jones, 2016, Brock, Moore, 2006). However, the population 
followed a hyperbolic trend before 1970 when the inflection point occurred (Korotayev, 2007, 
Golosovsky, 2010). Current exponential growth trends are fully consistent with the proposed model. 
3. Results 
3.1. Definitions 
There are multiple definitions of technological singularity. Most of them are qualitative: they 
refer to a period or a moment when some explosive and extraordinary positive (in terms of the rate) 
event happens to technological growth. Sometimes it means that AI exceeds the level of human or 
intelligence, in other cases, it means the fact of irreversibility or uncontrollability of technological 
progress. Mostly the question of technological singularity is studied in the context of the development 
of artificial intelligence. It is supposed that the growth of artificial intelligence will reach a critical 
point at some time, and this critical point is defined as the singularity.  
There is always an essential level of ambiguity in these explanations. Since we can take 
different measures of machine intelligence and compare it with human intelligence differently, model 
predictions may vary a lot. Even if the machine intelligence growth trend is robust and known, it may 
deliver a clear understanding of when the singularity may come only in rare cases. For example, let 
us consider the case of the exponential growth of artificial intelligence. Although it is clear that the 
rate of this growth exceeds (or will exceed sooner or later) the growth rate of human intelligence 
(which is put to zero in most of the similar models) it tells close to nothing either about the time of 
the singularity or about the possibility of the singularity itself. Indeed, if the difference between human 
intelligence and the current level of artificial intelligence is large enough, the singularity may not 
happen at any reasonable point in the future, even if the growth is exponential. It the ratio of human 
intelligence to artificial intelligence approaches infinity, then the singularity will occur infinitely late.  
Hence, in order to avoid the ambiguity resulting from the vagueness of the definition of 
intelligence and its estimation, let us differentiate between weak and strong definitions of singularity. 
Weak singularity: machine intelligence exceeds human intelligence. 
Strong singularity: machine intelligence approaches infinity in finite time. 
Actually, the strong definition of singularity is anticipated by these words of Good (1965): 
“Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual 
activities of any man however clever. Since the design of machines is one of these intellectual 
activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then 
unquestionably be an ”intelligence explosion”, and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. 
Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention that man need ever make.”  
If we apply the strong definition of singularity, we are likely to avoid the error of mistaking 
non-singularity for singularity. In other words, if the strong singularity is achieved, then any other 
singularity is achieved as well.   
By implementing the definition of strong singularity, we get rid of ambiguity. If we cannot 
agree on specific criteria of achievement of singularity under various models (which function value 
means singularity), we can use the strong definition of singularity, for if 𝐴 → ∞, then any value is 
achieved.  
Singularity here is defined further in the paper as a moment in n time when A in formula (1) 
approaches infinity. This type of singularity is known in the literature as a finite-time singularity 
(Sandberg, 2010). We shall later denote the moment of singularity calculated as the distance from 
starting time in the model in years as 𝑡𝑠. 
Of course, artificial intelligence neither can reach the “infinite” value of development, nor it 
can grow nonstop as fast as it can be allowed mathematically since there are physical burdens of AI 
development (Lloyd, 2000). Yet these burdens are extremely high and, considering our level of 
intelligence, we can ignore them. Our goal here is just to show what long-term trends in AI 
development can be and what explosive scenarios are possible. Undoubtedly, different types of 
limitations can change and stop these trends, but first, we need to investigate basic options. 
3.2. Basic model 
Let us suppose that the growth of artificial intelligence is exponential and depends on some 
constant coefficient k and the intelligence level of the engineer I. In the current case, the engineer is, 
predictably, a human. Thus, I is the human intelligence level. Hence, 
𝑑𝐴 = 𝑘𝐼𝐴𝑑𝑡          (2) 
Then, the solution of the equation (2) is: 
𝐴 = 𝑐𝑒𝑘𝐼𝑡1           (3) 
There are a lot of measures of “intelligence”. However, most of them are qualitative and thus 
cannot be used in our analysis. Quantitative measures are, on the other hand, not very representative, 
since they are just some correlates of what we usually define by “intelligence”. But the non-perfect 
correlation of these quantitative measures with “actual intelligence” is less problematic in the case of 
finite-time singularity models. All the implications can be applied for different measures and further 
development of the measure of intelligence can make the models more precise and powerful. 
We can take processor performance as a measure of artificial intelligence development. 
Empirical data (Denning, 2017) shows that it doubles every 18 months (1,5 years). Since we are 
interested in relative measures, we suppose that for 𝑡 = 0, 𝐴 = 1. Then, I is the value that shows how 
many times human intellect at the moment exceeds the artificial one. 
{𝑅
𝑡1 = 𝑐𝑒𝑘𝐼𝑡1
𝑐𝑒0 = 1
                     (4) 
where R is annual growth rate. 
Then, 
𝑐 = 1; 𝑘 =
𝑙𝑛1,5872
𝐼
         (5) 
An illustration of exponential growth dynamics is given in figure 1. 
But what is the value of I? If we compare directly computation performance measures in 
FLOPS, the results are the following. Estimates for brain performance in FLOPS vary by orders of 
magnitude, from 3 ∗ 1013 to 1025 FLOPS. The median estimate is 1019 FLOPS (Sandberg, 2016). 
Modern computers (such as Summit) can reach the speed of 1017 FLOPS. Based on this, the difference 
between human and modern artificial intelligence measured in this crude way is several orders of 
magnitude, with the median estimate of 2 orders. Then, estimation for k can be, for example, 
𝑘 =
𝑙𝑛1,5872
100
≈ 0,00462                                                                                    (6) 
But the growth dynamics changes when A reaches the level of I. From now on, it is more 
efficient to apply artificial intelligence for the design of artificial intelligence. AI becomes an engineer. 
Analytically, it can be written as 
𝑑𝐴 = 𝑘𝐴2𝑑𝑡           (7) 
 Then, 
𝐴 =
−1
𝑘𝑡2+𝑐
          (8) 
But in this model for 𝑡2 = 0, 𝐴 = 𝐼, then 
𝐼 = −
1
𝐶
          (9) 
and 
𝐴 = −
1
𝑘𝑡2−
1
𝐼
                   (10) 
Is it reasonable? The formulas support the intuitive conclusion: higher growth rate and human 
intelligence today mean higher speed of reaching the singularity. 
An illustration of hyperbolic growth dynamics is given in figure 2. 
Hence, a positive deviation from the linear trend on a log scale can be a sign of the approaching 
of finite-time singularity. 
If I=100, then 𝐴 = 𝐼 when 𝑡1 ≈10: 
𝑡1 =
𝑙𝑛100
𝑙𝑛1,5872
≈ 9.97                  (11) 
Taking into account formula (10) and based on the definition in formula (1), the moment of 
singularity is:  
𝑡2 =
1
𝑟
                    (12) 
where 𝑟 = ln𝑅 
For our r, 𝑡2 ≈2,16. 
Hence, the moment of singularity is defined only by the initial growth rate of artificial 
intelligence (in our case it is processor performance) and by the level of human intelligence relative 
to the level of artificial intelligence.  
Combining 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, we get that for the parameters mentioned above, time distance of 
singularity 𝑡𝑠 is approximately equal to 12 years.  
In general, the hyperbolic growth can begin earlier than AI reaches the level of human 
intelligence. It may happen because AI, still being less generally intelligent than humans, will be more 
proficient in the development of AI or in some corresponding areas, such as the production and 
development of computers. Moreover, the emergent effects of cooperation between humans and AIs 
may lead to a hyperbolic explosion (or similar trends). Evidence suggests that in some tasks (like 
chess) when cooperating with AI, humans are able to outperform both humans and AIs operating 
separately (Evans, 2018). Also, the finding that groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform 
groups of high-ability problem solvers is an argument in favor of this assumption (Hong, Page, 2004). 
Of course, computations conducted in the section should be considered just an illustration of 
the usage of the model. Even if basic assumptions are correct, the empirical value of I is extremely 
hard to measure correctly. But if we are certain about underlying assumptions, we can conclude that 
singularity is very probable in the observable future (decades or centuries), independently of a specific 
value of I. Exponential character of the model implies that order-of-magnitude error in the estimation 
of I results in a linear error in the estimation of 𝑡𝑠 which is less than 5 years and is constant for every 
order of magnitude of I. It means that if we, for example, overestimate the level of development of 
artificial intelligence 100 000 times, the resulting error in 𝑡𝑠 will be less than 25 years. But this 
conclusion holds only under specific assumptions. The more general case is presented in the next 
section. 
3.3. Extensions of the model 
In a more general case, AI growth rate may depend on the intelligence of the engineer non-
linearly: 
𝑑𝐴
𝐴𝑛
= 𝑘𝑑𝑡                   (13) 
Then, growth dynamics function for n>1 is  
𝐴 = (−
1
(−𝑘𝑡2−
𝐼1−𝑛
1−𝑛
)(1−𝑛)
)
1
𝑛−1                 (14) 
 Corresponding time of reaching the singularity after the moment when 𝐴 = 𝐼: 
𝑡2 =
−1
(1−𝑛)𝑘𝐼𝑛−1
                  (15) 
Naturally, n must be larger than 1 (when n=1, the growth dynamics are exponential, hence no 
finite-time singularity). It is interesting to investigate limit cases for 𝑡2:  
lim
𝑛→1
−1
(1−𝑛)𝑘𝐼𝑛−1
= ∞                (16) 
lim
𝑛→∞
−1
(1−𝑛)𝑘𝐼𝑛−1
= 0                (17) 
The moment of singularity is thus defined by the initial growth rate of artificial intelligence, 
the level of human intelligence relative to the level of artificial intelligence, and the nature of the 
relationship between the intellect of the engineer and the rate of growth of artificial intelligence. 
But if the growth rate of intelligence depends on the intelligence of the engineer 
logarithmically, the singularity will never be reached: 
𝑑𝐴 = ln(𝐴)𝐴𝑘𝑑𝑡                  (18) 
Then, growth dynamics function is: 
𝐴 = 𝑒𝑒
𝑐+𝑘𝑡
                   (19) 
This may be the case, as some researches argue (Moravec, 1999). Kurzweil supports this type 
of dynamics with empirical estimates (Kurzweil, 2010). 
Hence, there are some possible positive relationships between the intellect of the engineer and 
the rate of growth of artificial intelligence that do not lead to singularity. Obviously, we managed to 
find such an example even among basic elementary functions. Of course, all functions with growth 
rates smaller than of the logarithmic function will also not lead to finite-time singularity.  
It is, anyway, impossible to define function I based only on our current trend of growth. Since 
for every function, I and artificial intelligence growth rate R there will always be some k that satisfies 
equation (2): 
𝑘 =
𝑙𝑛𝑅
𝐼
                   (20) 
Thus, other methods need to be used in order to understand the patterns of growth after 𝐴 ≥ 𝐼. 
These methods may rely on the assumption that the transit from exponential growth dynamics to 
hyperbolical growth dynamics will not be instantaneous. If artificial intelligence starts to accelerate 
growth rates before 𝐴 = 𝐼, we can observe the nature of the future (probably) hyperbolical growth 
before 𝐴 = 𝐼.  
3.4. Stochastic dynamics models 
Let us add a stochastic term to the model. A stochastic process is defined as: 
𝑑𝐴 = 𝑎𝐴(𝑡,𝑊(𝑡))𝑑𝑡 + 𝑏𝐴(𝑡,𝑊(𝑡))𝑑𝑊(𝑡)               (21) 
 We are interested in the investigation of the behavior of models described above in the case 
when the uncertainty is added. For this purpose, we will use the concept of time-average growth rate 
(Peters, 2019) which allows to track the most likely behavior of a given stochastic process (for large 
enough time). Time average value of X will be denoted as 𝑋𝑡.  
Let us determine the time-average growth rate of the model described in subsection 3.2 with a 
stochastic term added: 
𝑑𝐴 = 𝑘𝐼𝐴𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐼𝐴𝑑𝑊(𝑡)                  (22) 
In the exponential stage, the result is well-known (Hull, 2009): 
  𝐴𝑡 = 𝑒
(𝑘𝐼−
1
2
𝐼𝜎2)𝑡1                  (23) 
 But in hyperbolic stage stochastic dynamics differ. Let us assume that growth volatility is 
proportional to the artificial intelligence development level: 
  𝑑𝐴 = 𝑘𝐴2𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝐴2𝑑𝑊(𝑡)                 (24) 
 Let us try to find an appropriate ergodicity transformation u (Peters, 2018): 
  𝑑𝑢 = 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑡 + 𝑏𝑢𝑑𝑊(𝑡)                      (25) 
 where 𝑎𝑢, 𝑏𝑢 are constants. Hence, 𝑢 should be an arithmetic Brownian motion (for which the 
ergodic property (Birkhoff’s equation, Moore, 2015) holds). 
 The following condition must hold: 
  
𝜕𝑢
𝑑𝐴
=
𝑏𝑢
𝜎𝐴2
                   (26) 
 As a result of Ito`s formula and condition (25), this must hold: 
  𝑎𝐴 =
𝑎𝑢
𝑏𝑢
𝜎𝐴2 +
1
2
𝐴22𝜎2𝐴 = 𝐴2(
𝑎𝑢
𝑏𝑢
𝜎 + 𝜎2𝐴)              (27) 
 We know that 𝑎𝐴 = 𝑘𝐴
2. Then, 
  𝑎𝑢 = (𝑘 − 𝜎
2𝐴)
𝑏𝑢
𝜎
                  (28) 
 Generally, 𝑎𝑢 is not a constant (𝑎𝑢 depends on A), and thus time-average growth dynamics 
cannot be defined. But, from (26) we know that: 
  𝑢 = −
𝑏𝑢
𝐴
                   (29) 
 Hence,  
  𝑎𝑢 = (𝑘 +
𝜎2
𝑈
)
𝑏𝑢
𝜎
                  (30) 
 When 𝑈 → −∞, (in other words, for small enough 𝐴) approximate time average can be found. 
This is evident, since the corresponding hyperbolic function grows very slowly and almost lineary for 
small t.  
But in the hyperbolic stage of the growth, time average trajectory does not exist. Let us use 
Monte Carlo simulation to illustrate this. We approximate formula 24 with parameters k=0.05, 𝜎=0.05. 
The results demonstrate that the singularity is being reached at significantly different points in time 
(from 25 to 200 periods, with 200 periods simulated), whereas in the corresponding deterministic 
model (formula 7) the singularity is reached in 25 periods. In some simulations, the singularity is not 
reached at all, and in all these cases the simulated growth dynamics appear to differ a lot. 
There is no unequivocal growth trajectory, and the growth explosions (which practically can 
be equivalent to finite-time singularity) occur at significantly different points in time, for example, in 
approximately 26, 85, or 180 periods. 
In some cases (for large enough 𝜎 compared to 𝑘) the hyperbolic-like growth explosion is not 
reached for any reasonable time. Figure 3 illustrates the simulated dynamics for the parameters 𝑘 =
0.01, 𝜎 = 0.1, and for 200 periods. Note that in the corresponding deterministic model (formula 7) the 
singularity is reached in 100 periods. 
 This can cancel the singularity even if the dynamics are hyperbolic. In other words, if we add 
a stochastic term to the finite-singularity model, large fluctuations may make the singularity 
impossible in a reasonable time.  
 Another important Monte-Carlo observation is that higher volatility makes hyperbolic 
dynamics look like exponential one (figure 5). Hence, in the case of a high volatility, the hyperbolic 
growth trend may be mistaken for exponential growth trend. On the other hand, the exponential growth 
trend cannot be mistaken for the hyperbolic one. 
But time-average growth rate can be defined if convenient 𝑎𝐴 is applied, namely: 
𝑎𝐴 =
𝑎𝑢
𝑏𝑢
𝑏𝐴(𝐴) +
1
2
𝑏𝐴(𝐴)𝑏𝐴
′(𝐴)                 (31) 
 In this case, the time-average growth rate will exist. However, whether corresponding terms 
𝑏𝐴 and 𝑎𝐴 are empirically relevant, is questionable. 
The same considerations can be applied to the general model described in subsection 3.3. 
3.5. Some other ways to reach the finite-time singularity 
But сan singularity be achieved without resorting to a recursively improving artificial 
intelligence that is smarter than humans? There are some factors that can lead to singularity even if 
the intelligence level of the engineer is not improving. For example, if the growth of artificial 
intelligence and of GDP Y depends correspondingly on the level of artificial intelligence and GDP:  
{
𝑑𝑌 = 𝑘1𝑌𝐴𝑑𝑡
𝑑𝐴 = 𝑘2𝑌𝐴𝑑𝑡
                  (31) 
Then, if A=1 for t=o,  
𝐴 =
1
1−𝑘1𝑡
                   (32) 
Instead of GDP there can be another factor similarly influencing the growth of artificial 
intelligence (technological progress, computational power, investment in AI, AI-corporations 
revenues, etc.). In general, if there is a vector X of n factors and level of AI development A (which is 
a scalar), and for every element 𝐸𝑖 of the vector (A, X) holds 
 𝑑𝐸𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖∏ 𝐸𝑗𝑑𝑡
𝑛+1
𝑗=1                    (33) 
then finite-time singularity will happen. Of course, it is also true for  
𝑑𝐸𝑖 = 𝑓(∏ 𝐸𝑗)𝑑𝑡
𝑛+1
𝑗=1                   (34) 
 where f is a function that f(x) grows faster than kx.  
 On the other hand, hyperbolic growth can be prevented if the corresponding function grows 
slowly enough. The implications will be similar to the implications for the result (18). Generally, it 
appears to be true that effectively any reasonable connection between AI development and underlying 
variables represented by function F will not lead to finite-time singularity if the function F of the 
underlying variables grows slowly enough.  
3.6. The reverse task 
Let us solve the reverse task. What is the general view of the function, so that equation (1) is 
true? 
Consider general continuous function F(A) which indicates how much AI improves depending 
on its current level. In other words, 
dA=F(A)dt                   (35) 
𝑡 = ∫
𝑑𝐴
𝐹(𝐴)
𝐴(𝑡)
1
                   (36) 
Condition (1) in terms of (36) means that 
𝑛 = ∫
𝑑𝐴
𝐹(𝐴)
∞
1
                   (37) 
A reasonable assumption is that F(A) must be monotonous. So does F(A)-1. From calculus, we 
know that the integral converges if F(A) has asymptotic behavior faster than A1+s, where s is any 
positive number. Sadly, there is no boundary function with which we could compare all others and 
know whether the integral converges or diverges. 
4. Discussion. 
The key advantage of the model is its robustness to the assumptions. It demonstrates that if AI 
becomes a better AI engineer than humans, the assumptions leading to finite-time singularity are quite 
general. Consequently, if the finite-time singularity is achieved, it necessarily implies a significant 
impact on key macroeconomic and technological parameters of human civilization, contrary to 
infinite-time definitions of the singularity. However, high enough volatility (random deviations of the 
AI growth from the trend) may prevent occurring of the finite-time singularity, even if the 
corresponding determenistic growth model leads to it. Hence, the advantages of the model reveal 
themselves only in the case if stochastic effects are small enough. Practically, large intelligence 
explosions that happened in the simulation of stochastic hyperbolic models in subsection 3.4 can be 
equivalent to the effects of finite-time singularity, although in this case “infinite” level of AI 
development is not reached mathematically. The question which effectively needs to be answered here 
is: whether this explosion will be large enough so that change of the regime (phase transition) 
consistent with the hyperbolic growth model happens? 
Empirically, the growth of AI seems to be exponential or double-exponential, which 
theoretically can be interpreted in various ways. In terms of the models described in the paper, this 
may be consistent with 3 possible scenarios: 
1. The first stage of deterministic AI development with human engineers. 
2. AI-self-improvement feedback loop under the assumption that AI growth rates depend on 
the intelligence of the engineer (or similar variable) logarithmically. 
3. Hyperbolic stage of stochastic AI development with a high level of volatility. 
It is impossible to make a choice among these 3 options solemnly based on the framework of 
the discussed models. Nevertheless, the first option is likely to be the most realistic, since AI did not 
exceed human intelligence yet in any general sense, and we did not observe the change of the growth 
regime in recent time. The third option, in principle, can be distinguished from the others, if we can 
observe the level of volatility consistent with it. 
 Whereas hyperbolic growth models developed in the study are mathematically a mere 
variation of the existing AI development models, they lead us to several essentially novel results and 
methods, namely: 
1. The illustration of the generality of the assumptions leading to finite-time singularity. 
2. Determination of the relative advantages of the concept of finite-time singularity. 
3. Introduction of stochastic technological singularity models and investigation of the impact of 
stochasticity on the AI development trends. 
4. A mathematical definition of the conditions leading to finite-time singularity. 
Several theoretical and empirical questions related to the study remain unanswered. Further 
research may focus on the following problems: 
- Application of the stochastic calculus to the technological singularity in general. Although we 
have examined the effect of stochasticity on hyperbolic growth models, its impact can be 
significant in the case of weak singularity models as well; 
- Further empirical testing of the proposed models, including the tests that attempt to select the 
most empirically relevant explanation of the observed exponential or double-exponential 
trends and the test that determines an exact connection between the level of intelligence of the 
engineer and AI growth rate; 
- If the proposed mechanics of hyperbolic growth regime is correct (AI growth rate depends on 
the level of intelligence of the engineer), a question of high importance is a timely indication 
of the moment when the exponential trend is substituted by the hyperbolic trend (in other 
words, the moment when AI exceed human intelligence and intelligence explosion begins). 
An establishment of a kind of a “barometer” tracking the deviations of the growth trend from 
exponential one may be reasonable; 
- Development of other deterministic finite-time singularity models and a more broad study of 
empirical conditions that may lead to it. Especially, it is worth investigating which economic 
models can transform into finite-time singularity; 
- Empirical estimation of the stochasticity of the AI development models. Developed stochastic 
models can be applied only if the corresponding stochastic process is Itô process 
(transformation of Brownian motion). Real-world dynamics may be different. For example, 
the application of fractional Brownian motion may be required; 
- Investigation of the application of the developed models to other fields, such as, for instance, 
population dynamics in biology and evolution; 
- Determination of exact conditions when the volatility is high enough to prevent the hyperbolic 
intelligence explosion. 
In general, if it is assumed that the key effect of finite-time singularity is phase transition resulting 
from hyperbolic-like intelligence explosion and the growth dynamics may be affected by the 
stochasticity (which potentially prevents arbitrarily large finite-time growth), the question of whether 
this phase transition will be achieved cannot be answered relying only on the study of growth 
dynamics, i. e. without the study of artificial intelligence itself (which level of the development of AI 
is high enough to cause phase transition). 
5. Conclusions.  
Finite-time singularity can be achieved via permanent AI self-improvement if the function 
representing the connection between the intelligence of the engineer and the AI growth rate grows fast 
enough. Stochasticity, under reasonable assumption about growth dynamics in general, negatively 
affects time-average growth rates of AI and can even lead to canceling of the finite-time singularity. 
Moderate volatility can make hyperbolic dynamics look like exponential. Developed models are 
consistent with empirical evidence, although various interpretations are possible.  
Specific singularity time estimated based on the developed model may vary a lot depending 
on 2 kinds of assumptions: assumptions about the difference in AI and human intelligence; 
assumptions about the connection between the intelligence of the engineer and the AI growth rate. If 
human intelligence exceeds AI by 100 times (which is assumed based on the estimation of the 
computational power measured in FLOPS) and the connection between the intelligence of the engineer 
and the AI growth rate is linear, then the time of singularity is approximately 12 years from the year 
2019 (hence, around 2030). However, this estimation should rather be considered as a lower bound, 
for several reasons: firstly, the function representing the connection between the intelligence of the 
engineer and the AI growth rate may grow slower than the linear function; secondly, the difference 
between AI and human intelligence is likely to be larger; thirdly, even if computation power of 
computers will be equal to the computational power of the human brain, it will not lead automatically 
to the equality of these 2 types intelligence; fourthly, the impact of volatility can postpone the 
singularity moment. Hence, although it is feasible to answer the question “When the singularity is not 
possible yet?”, the question “When it will occur with a high level of certainty?” requires further 
research. 
There are some factors that can lead to singularity even if the intelligence level of the engineer 
is not improving. For example, if the growth of artificial intelligence and of GDP depends 
correspondingly on the level of artificial intelligence and GDP. 
Monte Carlo simulations demonstrate that if a stochastic term is added to the finite-singularity 
model, large enough fluctuations may make the singularity impossible in a reasonable time. Hence, 
the conclusions described above will hold only in the case of low enough volatility. 
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Figures Legends 
Figure 1. Example of exponential growth dynamics in linear and logarithmic (log) scales 
Source: own results. Created via Python Matplotlib 
Figure 2. Example of hyperbolic growth dynamics in linear and logarithmic (log) scales 
Source: own results. Created via Python Matplotlib 
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 Figure 3. Simulation of stochastic hyperbolic growth dynamics (formula 24) for parameters k=0.05, 
𝜎=0.05 in the cases when the finite-time singularity is not reached in 200 periods 
 
Source: own results. Created via Python Matplotlib 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Simulation of stochastic hyperbolic growth dynamics (formula 24) for parameters k=0.01, 
𝜎=0.1 
 
Source: own results. Created via Python Matplotlib 
Figure 5. Simulation of stochastic hyperbolic growth dynamics (formula 24) for parameters k=0.01, 
𝜎=0.001, 0.02 
𝜎=0.001 𝜎=0.02 
  
Source: own results. Created via Python Matplotlib 
 
